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Recently, many science systems have faced the rise of thematic task forces and national research programmes aiming to coordinate research activities in areas of strategic priority. Such organizations mediate between public research organizations on the one hand and research councils and the government on the other (van der Meulen and Rip 1998). They aim to coordinate the allocation of funding (as an intermediate goal) and to coordinate research agendas (as an eventual goal). What mechanisms are responsible for effective coordination? In this paper this question will be addressed based on a theoretical exercise and a case study of the Netherlands Genomics Initiative (NGI), a Dutch task force with an annual research budget of about 40 Million euros, operational from 2002 until 2012. The empirical analysis is based on interviews with researchers and key representatives, bibliometrics and document analysis. Theoretically, this paper builds on science policy studies, sociology of science and socio-economic theories of coordination. My aim is to contribute to the understanding of research coordination in general, and of the coordinating efforts of intermediary organizations in particular.

Regarding both funding allocation and research agendas, the efforts of task forces such as NGI should be seen against the background of existing coordination mechanisms. Concerning funding allocation, the background situation is a complex patchwork of possible funding sources, each with its own conditions and requirements (Lepori forthcoming). Most research groups possess a certain fixed amount of resources. This basic supply of resources can be complemented in essentially two ways, by trading resources with other groups (collaborations, knowledge sharing) and by acquiring additional project funding. NGI seems to add in two ways to this existing patchwork of available funding. First it provides an additional amount of funding with a particular set of conditions. Project funds can be characterized in terms of:
-	degree of content monitoring (accountability)
-	degree of steering of content at the moment of allocation
-	other requirements for allocation (e.g. track record, collaboration, valorization potential)
-	decision-making procedure of allocation
A detailed analysis of the allocation of this money will reveal what coordination mechanisms are at stake here. As a second intervention, NGI strives to enhance the mutual orchestration of some existing funding sources. By providing a ‘one stop shop’ for all genomics research, NGI has the ambition to avoid conflicting schedules and to increase the focus in all genomics research efforts in the Netherlands, in order to increase mutual synergy. Empirical analysis should reveal the degree to which this goal is achieved and the mechanisms at work to this end. 

Coordinated funding allocation is not a goal in itself, however. It serves an instrumental function to the coordination of research agendas. Also on this level, the effects of task forces such as NGI should be regarded as marginal effects in relation to the existing incentive structure determining research agendas. Following Latour and Woolgar we can assume that the driving factor of agenda choice is the need for credibility. Scientists invest resources in their work, hoping to earn new resources in the form of publications, recognition and indirectly also funding (Latour and Woolgar 1986; Hessels et al. 2009). Within this cyclical process, agenda choice can be seen as a quasi-economic assessment of the available resources and expected rewards. Because the available resources are always finite, they will have to be utilized efficiently. For this reason scientists will attempt to employ them in such a way that the chance on rewards is optimal. These rewards should be conceived as credibility in the broader sense, in the form of publications, prizes or (informal) reputation. In (theoretical) situations where no deliberate coordination interventions are conducted, a process of spontaneous coordination can be expected to occur, based on the competition for priority and associated rewards. Scientists continuously estimate the rewards expected along particular research lines. Optimal opportunities are found in areas where a certain critical mass of colleagues is working which can serve as a target audience, but which are not so crowded that the chance is too high that the battle for priority is lost to a rival (Stephan 1996). Task forces like NGI seem to intervene in this incentive structure in several ways. First, NGI offers additional resources for research in a specific area. This makes it more attractive to perform research in this given area, compared to other possibilities. In addition, NGI also modestly influences the rewards expected in certain research areas. By enhancing the public visibility of genomics in general, and by increasing the overall research effort in this area, it increases the rewards that can be earned here. Third, NGI also appears to introduce an additional management structure, with weak hierarchical features. Researchers participating in this programme have to tolerate a certain degree of ‘steering’ by the central board, and the director of the specific Genomics Centre they are part of. Empirical analysis will have to reveal the strength of this power, but it seems a significant feature that is absent in many other forms of research funding (e.g. institutional funding, research council). 

The intended empirical analysis of NGI will indicate what coordination mode is functioning here altogether. If NGI uses market coordination to allocate its funding across interested research departments, does this imply that markets also rule the coordination of research agendas? It seems that the coordination resulting from all active mechanisms is complex and can not be reduced to a single model. At first sight, one of the most striking features of NGI seems its (weak) hierarchical power. It strengthens and enlarges some existing markets, and it stimulates some existing network mechanisms. The hierarchy that it introduces, however, albeit quite weak, is completely new. 

As a final thought, in science policy the term coordination is often used to avoid the suggestion of hierarchy and to denote (or promote) a soft form of governance relying mainly on network mechanisms. This is confusing, however, because coordination can employ various mechanisms including (but not limited to) networks, markets and hierarchy. Moreover it can occur at various levels, ranging from individual research projects to whole policy instruments (or even national policies). My case study will identify one possible combination of coordination mechanisms active in a thematic task force. But many other varieties are possible. More empirical research and comparative analysis of existing data will be needed to complete the picture.
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